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What Does Graham Mean in Michigan?
by Kimberly A. Thomas, Clinical Professor, University of Michigan Law School
Introduction
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme 
Court held that life without parole could not be 
imposed on a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide 
crime.1  In this context, the Graham Court extensively 
discussed the diminished culpability of juvenile crimi-
nal defendants, as compared to adults.  The Court re-
lied on current scientific research regarding adolescent 
development and neuroscience.  While the narrowest 
holding of Graham has little impact in Michigan, the 
science it relies on, and the potential broader implica-
tions for adolescents in Michigan, are significant.
Graham Summary
Terrance Graham, was 16 years old when he and 
three other youths attempted to rob a restaurant and 
one of Graham’s accomplices hit the manager in the 
head with a metal bar.2  Graham was charged, as an 
adult, with armed burglary with assault or battery, 
a first-degree felony with a maximum penalty of 
life without parole, as well as with attempted armed 
robbery, and he pleaded guilty to both offenses. 3  At 
his sentencing hearing, Graham stated that it was his 
“first and last time getting in trouble,” and that he 
“made a promise to God and myself that if I get a 
second chance, I’m going to do whatever it takes to 
get to the [National Football League].”4  Graham was 
sentenced to 3 years of probation, with the first 12 
months served in jail.  
While on probation, Graham was arrested again 
after a high speed chase with police; this time for a 
home invasion robbery that allegedly occurred about 
one month before his 18th birthday.  At his violation 
of probation hearing on the burglary case, Graham 
denied involvement in the robbery, but admitted 
violating probation by fleeing police.5  At the hearing, 
the state also presented evidence about the robbery, 
including victim testimony.  Although the presentence 
investigation report recommended a sentence of 4 
years and the prosecution recommended 30 years, the 
judge, who was not the original judge on the case, 
sentenced him to the maximum sentence available – 
life without parole.6
The Graham Court distilled two strands of Eighth 
Amendment cases addressing the proportionality 
of sentences:  cases challenging “the length of term-
of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a 
particular case” and cases “in which the Court imple-
ments the proportionality standard by certain cat-
egorical restrictions on the death penalty.”7  In the first 
line of cases,8 the Court considers the circumstances 
of the cases to, first, compare the gravity of the offense 
and the severity of the penalty.  “ ‘[I]n the rare case 
in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an 
inference of gross disproportionality’ the court should 
then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sen-
tences received by other offenders in the same juris-
diction and with the sentences imposed for the same 
crime in other jurisdictions.”9  In the second class of 
cases, which, until Graham, had involved only death 
penalty cases, the Court had used categorical rules to 
evaluate the nature of the offense10 and characteristics 
of the offender.11  In these cases, the Court “first con-
siders ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as ex-
pressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to 
determine whether there is national consensus against 
the sentencing practice at issue . . . [then], guided by 
‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents 
and by the Court’s own understanding and interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, mean-
ing, and purpose,’ the Court must determine in the 
exercise of its own independent judgment whether the 
punishment in question violates the Constitution.”12 
The Court determined that Graham’s case, despite 
not involving  the death penalty, fit in the second 




“sentencing practice” as applied to a “class of offenders 
who have committed a range of crimes.”  
The Court found that although 37 states permit 
life without parole for non-homicide juvenile offend-
ers in some circumstances, actual sentencing practice 
showed a consensus against the imposition of life 
without parole in these cases.13  Though many states 
have moved to make it easier to prosecute juveniles in 
adult court instead of juvenile court, the Court was 
not persuaded that this showed that states intended to 
give life without parole sentences to these offenders.14  
Second, the Court exercised its “independent 
judgment” to consider the “culpability of the offend-
ers at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, 
along with the severity of the punishment,” including 
an inquiry into whether the sentence serves legitimate 
penological goals.  As for the offenders, the Court 
stated that Roper “established that because juveniles 
have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments.”15  The Court approvingly 
cited modern brain science, discussed in Roper, which 
shows “fundamental differences between juvenile 
and adult minds” including the fact that “parts of the 
brain involved in behavior control continue to mature 
through late adolescence.”16
As to the nature of the offenses, the Court said 
that it “has recognized that defendants who do not 
kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are 
categorically less deserving of the most serious forms 
of punishment than are murderers.”17  Therefore, ju-
veniles who do not kill or intend to kill have “twice di-
minished moral culpability.”18  The Court also found 
that the severity of the sentence was significant – it 
is “irrevocable” and “deprives the convict of the most 
basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”19  
Finally, the Court found that the sentence lacked any 
penological justification, as it was disproportionate 
to the goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation 
or rehabilitation when imposed on a juvenile for a 
nonhomicide offense.20  
The Court rejected a non-categorical approach 
as inadequate.  It determined that a categorical rule 
would allow all of the relevant juveniles a chance to 
show their “maturity and reform” through parole eli-
gibility.21  A categorical rule also better avoids the dif-
ficulty encountered by juvenile advocates and courts 
when considering the culpability of a youth who has 
committed a particularly brutal crime.22  
 Adolescents in Michigan Sentenced to Life 
Without Parole
Graham’s narrow holding on non-homicide of-
fenses will have almost no impact in Michigan; more 
broadly, however, Graham may result in greater 
challenges to the sentence of life without parole by 
the unusually high number of juveniles in Michigan 
given this sentence.  It may also result in challenges to 
extremely long term-of-years sentences for juveniles 
for non-homicide offenses.
In Michigan, prior to Graham, it was hypotheti-
cally possible for a 17 year-old to be sentenced to life 
without parole for an offense that did not involve a 
death.  Under the sentencing provisions for criminal 
sexual conduct in the first-degree against a person un-
der 13, there is a the mandatory sentence of life with-
out parole for someone who was previously convicted 
of a criminal sexual conduct offense against someone 
under 13 years old.23  According to the study cited by 
the Graham court, no juveniles are serving sentences 
under this provision.24  
Approximately 350 individuals are serving life 
without parole in Michigan for homicide crimes 
committed when they were a juvenile.  These persons 
received a life without parole sentence for crimes com-
mitted under 18 years old because they were either 17 
years old and, therefore, considered an adult under 
Michigan law, 25 or were 16 or under, but were tried 
and sentenced like an adult.  Adolescents can be tried 
and given an adult sentence if cases are directly filed 
by the prosecution in adult circuit court,26 the juvenile 
is tried and sentenced as an adult in family court, 27 
or if the case is waived by a judge into adult court.28  
When tried in adult court, if the juvenile is convicted 
of first-degree murder the sentence is automatically 
life without parole.29   
Some of these persons serving life without parole 
were juveniles who were not directly responsible for 
causing a death.  For example, under an aiding and 
abetting theory, someone can even be held respon-
sible for “those crimes that are the natural and prob-
able consequences of the offense he intends to aid or 
abet.”30  For felony murder liability, a defendant may 
intend to be the getaway driver for a robbery, yet can 
be convicted of murder if the defendant commit-
ted acts that assisted the commission of the killing, 
had “the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to 
create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with 
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knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the 
probable result . . . while committing, attempting to 
commit, or assisting in the commission of the predi-
cate felony.”31  
Impact of Graham on the Sentence of Life 
Without Parole for Juveniles in Michigan
Challenges to Life Without Parole for Juveniles 
under Graham
Broadly, the Graham Court reaffirmed that “[t]
he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth 
Amendment.”32  The Court also raised the hopes of 
those opposed to life without parole for juveniles 
through in its discussion of the lesser culpability of 
juveniles.  The Court also did this by focusing, in 
some parts of the opinion, on offenders “who did not 
kill or intend to kill,” suggesting that juveniles who 
did not commit the act or intend to commit the act 
also may not constitutionally receive the sentence of 
life without parole.     
Litigation following Graham33 will more clearly 
determine the meaning of the Court’s language, but 
for now both a categorical and a case-by-case approach 
to challenges to juvenile sentences remain viable.  
Under Graham, a defendant who makes a broad chal-
lenge to the unconstitutionality of a sentence for a 
particular offense (such as felony murder) or class of 
offenders (such as 14-year olds) should take the same 
approach as the Graham majority.  However, nothing 
in the Court’s opinion eliminated an Eighth Amend-
ment challenge to life without parole for a particular 
juvenile charged or convicted of homicide.   The 
Court’s analysis suggests that such a challenge should 
be brought under the “gross proportionality” test, 
as in Solem v. Helm34 and Harmelin v. Michigan,35 
previously applied to term of years challenges.  There-
fore, at this point, courts can expect to see Eighth 
Amendment challenges that both raise categorical 
challenges to the sentence of life without parole under 
the Graham analysis, and raise individual challenges to 
the proportionality of the sentence for the particular 
juvenile under the more traditional “gross proportion-
ality” standard.
The constitutionality could be litigated at the time 
of a waiver hearing,36 during sentencing when the 
court is deciding whether to sentence as an adult or as 
a juvenile,37 at sentencing in a direct file case, or the 
case of a 17 year old in adult court.  Parties should 
anticipate that counsel for the juvenile may submit 
expert affidavits, records, scientific information or 
articles, or other documents to support the motion.  
An evidentiary hearing, where counsel can present 
evidence or testimony may be helpful to making a full 
record of the facts and law considered by the court.   
Challenges to Juvenile Life Without Parole Under 
the Michigan Constitution
In light of Graham, the sentence of life without 
parole for any juvenile may also fail under the broader 
protections of the Michigan constitution.  Our con-
stitution provides that “cruel or unusual punishment 
shall not be inflicted.”38  Though the language of this 
provision is similar to the Eighth Amendment, Michi-
gan courts have given greater protection under its 
“cruel or unusual punishment” clause.39   The greater 
protection results, in part, from the differences in the 
constitutional texts.40 The state provision, banning 
“cruel or unusual punishment” rather than the “cruel 
and unusual punishments” of the Eighth Amend-
ment, “necessarily encompass[es] a broader sweep” of 
disallowed punishments.41  A punishment need not 
be both cruel and unusual to violate the state constitu-
tion; falling within one of these categories will suf-
fice.42  Additionally, the distinct history of Michigan’s 
constitution and the weight of case law in the state 
support a broader reading of the state provision.43
As a result of this distinct history, language, and case 
law, to determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual 
“requires consideration of the gravity of the offense, the 
harshness of the penalty, a comparison of the penalty to 
penalties for other crimes in this state, a comparison of 
the penalty to penalties imposed for the same offense in 
other states, and the goal of rehabilitation.”44  
The first prong weighs the gravity of the offense 
against the severity of the penalty, taking into account 
relevant facts about the culpability of the offender.45  
As emphasized by the Graham Court, juveniles have 
diminished culpability compared to adult offenders, 
a fact that must be taken into account when examin-
ing the gravity of an offense.46  In addition, children 
have a reduced ability to escape outside influences and 
inner impulses once in a bad situation because of their 
incomplete biological and mental development.47  
A comparison of life without parole sentences 




that juveniles who receive the sentence are treated 
disproportionately.  Life without parole is the most 
serious sentence that a Michigan offender can receive.48  
In Michigan, a large proportion of juveniles sentenced 
to life without parole committed felony murder or were 
convicted as aiders and abetters.49  Yet under state law, 
the same sentence will be given for youthful accom-
plices as for mature adults who commit premeditated 
murder. 50    
In Michigan, the second prong compares the 
sentences imposed on other offenders in the same 
jurisdiction, and the third prong compares sentences 
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.51  
On these, the sentence of life without parole for juve-
niles whose cases were directly filed into adult court 
may be particularly vulnerable to challenge.  Once a 
charging decision has been made,52 if convicted, these 
adolescents automatically receive life without parole,53 
without the ability of a judge to ever consider the 
maturity, potential for rehabilitation, circumstances of 
the case, or culpability of the child.  
The lack of discretion available in juvenile sentenc-
ing may also render the sentences imposed in this state 
unusual when compared to other states.  Less than 10 
other states restrict discretion as severly as Michigan.54  
Michigan’s complete denial of any individualized con-
sideration of the youth by the court in being tried in 
adult court and mandatory imposition of life without 
the possibility of parole makes it an outlier among 
the states.  This results in a disproportionately high 
number of juvenile life without parole sentences in 
Michigan, and the imposition of the penalty in cases 
where it would be unlikely for another state to impose 
the penalty.55  
Finally, Michigan requires an analysis of whether 
the challenged sentence serves the goal of rehabilita-
tion. 56  As emphasized by the Graham Court, life 
without the possibility of parole for a juvenile com-
pletely eliminates any goal of rehabilitation.57  “From 
a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate 
the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character defi-
ciencies will be reformed.”58  Further, most children 
“age out” of criminal behavior.59  
Even if non-rehabilitation goals are considered, 
little to no additional purpose of punishment is 
gained.60  “The case for retribution is not as strong 
with a minor as with an adult” because of their 
diminished culpability and maturity.61  Further, the 
added deterrent effect of life without the possibil-
ity of parole on a juvenile is minimal, as “the same 
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than 
adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible 
to deterrence.”62  Lastly, public safety is not furthered 
by incarcerating children after the danger they posed 
has passed.  In fact, as the Graham Court stated in the 
nonhomicide context, the State’s “irrevocable judg-
ment” about an adolescent’s value “is not appropriate 
in light  of a[n] . . . offender’s capacity for change and 
limited moral culpability.”63
The Michigan Supreme Court has never ruled on 
the constitutionality of life without parole for juve-
niles.64  The one published Michigan Court of Appeals 
opinion on a juvenile life without parole sentence was 
issued before Roper, and ruled on the previous juvenile 
transfer system, in which a judge made a determina-
tion about whether or not the child should be sen-
tenced as an adult.65  In fact, this determination was 
integral to the Court’s analysis of the required factors 
and its finding of constitutionality.66 
Broader Lessons of Graham
Courts and advocates in Michigan can certainly 
expect the impact of Graham to ripple for some time.  
Most directly, advocates will likely be advancing 
challenges to the sentence of life without parole for ju-
veniles in Michigan.  Less directly, Graham’s decision 
provides instruction for all legal professionals working 
with juvenile offenders.
Developmental Psychology and Neuroscience of 
Adolescence in a Nutshell:  What we can learn 
from Graham making juvenile sentencing and 
dispositional decisions.
The court, advocates for juveniles, and prosecutors 
should make sure they are up-to-date on information 
on adolescent development and neuroscience that 
has influenced the Graham Court.  The amicus briefs 
in Graham from the American Medical Association, 
et al67 and the American Psychological Association et 
al68 discuss these ideas in more detail and are sum-
marized here.
Developmental psychology and neuroscience 
research confirm that juveniles, even those in late 
adolescence, are less able to control their impulses 
and exercise self-control,69are less capable of weighing 
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risks and rewards, 70 and are less future-oriented and 
able to take into account the consequences of their 
actions.71  Mature judgment requires cognitive, social, 
and emotional skills, and while late adolescents may 
have logical reasoning ability, they “nonetheless lack 
the abilities to exercise self-restraint, to weigh risk and 
reward appropriately, and to envision the future that 
are just as critical to mature judgment.”72 
In addition to these individual immaturities, ado-
lescents are particularly susceptible to the influences 
of their environment and other people.  Adolescents, 
more than adults, commit crimes in groups, because 
they want to conform to peer expectations and obtain 
respect from others and cannot resist peer pressure, 
the way an adult can.73  
Additionally, a normal part of adolescence is en-
gaging in risk-taking and criminal activity, which re-
sults, in part, from their lower capacity for judgment.  
“‘[N]umerous . . . self-report studies have documented 
that it is statistically aberrant to refrain from crime 
during adolescence.’”74  Further, research shows that 
the majority of youthful offenders will cease crimi-
nal activity.75  As the Roper Court said, it is “the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable cor-
ruption.”76  Psychologists and psychiatrists, let alone 
courts, cannot determine which youth will desist and 
which youth will go on to commit future crimes.77
Modern neuroscience also shows differences 
between adolescents and adults.  MRI imaging has 
permitted scientists to understand the human brain’s 
progression from childhood through adolescence into 
adulthood.78  In its brief, the American Medical As-
sociation explained: 
In this regard, two complementary observa-
tions have been especially revealing.  First, the 
parts of the brain that work together to sup-
port the control of behavior, including the pre-
frontal cortex79 (which comprises roughly the 
front third of the human brain) continue to 
mature even through late adolescence.80  Sec-
ond, in making behavioral choices, adolescents 
rely more heavily than adults on systems and 
areas of the brain that promote risk-taking and 
sensation-seeking behavior. 81
Application of the science to effectively 
communicate with juveniles
All parties who interact with juvenile defendants 
know that communication with these persons can be 
particularly challenging or frustrating.  The challenge 
is particularly daunting for attorneys representing 
these juveniles.  In discussing why the Court chose to 
reject a case-by-case approach, the Graham court also 
highlighted the difficulty of representing adolescents.  
“[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults 
also put them at a significant disadvantage in crimi-
nal proceedings.  Juveniles mistrust adults and have 
limited understandings of the criminal justice system 
and the roles of the institutional actors within it.  
They are less likely than adults to work effectively with 
their lawyers to aid in their defense.”82  The Court also 
noted that juveniles’ difficulty in weighing long-term 
consequences, impulsiveness and lack of trust “impair 
the quality of a juvenile defendant’s representation.”83   
Attorneys representing these adolescents are keenly 
aware of this ethical and professional challenge.  At-
torneys must, “as far as reasonably possible, maintain a 
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client” who 
is impaired due to his age,84 including following the 
duties to maintain client confidences85 and to abide 
by the client’s decisions on the major choices in the 
case, such as pleas, jury waiver and client testimony.86  
Maintaining a normal client relationship is especially 
difficult when parents, probation officers, or others do 
not understand or appreciate the need for a vigorous, 
confidential advocate for the accused adolescent.87 
Make decisions based on full information              
about the juvenile
As part of the inquiry into the sentencing or dis-
position of a juvenile (or in evaluating any challenges 
to the constitutionality of a sentence of life without 
parole), advocates and the court will need adequate 
information about the particular juvenile offender.    
Juvenile advocates may be familiar with information 
about their client’s role in the offense and the offense 
itself; however, fewer attorneys are adept at uncovering 
information about the client himself.  This investigation 
must begin as soon as counsel is retained or appointed, 
even if anticipated only in the sentencing or disposition 





Common sources of information include:
• School records, including individualize educa-
tion programs (IEPs);
• County Community Mental Health (CMH) 
records;
• Other service providers, including pediatricians, 
therapists, counselors;
• Juvenile court records, including information 
on investigations and allegations of abuse and/
or neglect by the client’s parent(s).
Further, courts may need to provide funds for, or 
obtain information from, an expert in order to give 
thorough consideration to the constitutional chal-
lenge.88  Counsel for the juvenile may wish to apply 
to the court for funds in order to obtain an expert to 
evaluate a juvenile, obtain affidavits or testimony about 
the client or about adolescent development, or other 
unique aspects of the case.  
Conclusion
While the narrowest holding of Graham may not 
have a significant impact in Michigan, the ripples of 
Graham, especially in terms of challenges to the sen-
tence of life without parole for juveniles and the discus-
sion of adolescent culpability, will extend throughout 
Michigan. 
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